This note is about the \calculational style" of presenting proofs introduced by Dijkstra and Scholten and adopted in some books on theoretical computer science. We de ne the concept of a calculation, which is a formal counterpart of the idea of a calculational proof. The de nition is in terms of a new formalization DS of predicate logic. Any proof tree in the system DS can be represented as a sequence of calculations. This fact shows that any logically valid predicate formula has a calculational proof.
Introduction
This note is about the calculational proof format introduced by Dijkstra and Scholten 1990] on the basis of ideas due to W. H. J. Feijen. Their work has had an impact on the presentation of proofs in computer science research, and even on undergraduate education in computer science (as the result, in particular, of the publication of a textbook by Gries and Schneider 1993] ). These ideas can be also viewed as an interesting discovery in logic, although this fact has so far remained largely unnoticed.
We know that inventing proofs of predicate formulas in a Hilbert style deduction system is an unpleasant task unless we use some metamathematical tools such as the deduction theorem. On the other hand, proving formulas in a natural deduction system is relatively easy. The role of the deduction theorem and of natural deduction is determined by the fact that they provide a mechanism for discharging assumptions.
What we learn from Dijkstra and Scholten is that the importance of assumptions in formal proofs is overrated: with the right choice of inference rules, proving predicate formulas is easy even without introducing assumptions (and without the use of auxiliary derivable objects such as sequents). According to our analysis of calculational proofs, these surprisingly powerful inference rules 1 are F (G) G H F (H) and F (H) G H F (G)   ; where G, H are free for a propositional symbol P in F (P ).
In propositional logic, these are actually the only rules needed to derive arbitrary tautologies from a small set of axiom schemas. Accumulating a supply of equivalences proved using rules (1) gives us the same feeling as accumulating a supply of identities in high school algebra or trigonometry: the more we have proved, the greater is the assortment of tools at our disposal when we approach a new problem. The more equivalences we have derived in predicate logic, the more choices we have for the second premise when rules (1) are used to prove new formulas.
Here is how Dijkstra and Scholten describe their experiences with this process:
: : : we approached the task of designing the theory we needed as an exercise in formal mathematics, little suspecting that we were heading for a few of the most pleasant surprises in our professional lives: : : W]e found ourselves in possession of a tool that surpassed our wildest expectations. As we got used to it, it became an absolute delight to work with. The rst pleasant: : : experience was the killing of the myth that formal proofs are of necessity long, tedious, laborious, error-prone, and what-haveyou: : : For quite a while each new and surprisingly e ective proof was a source of delight and excitement: : : In the course of the process we profoundly changed our ways of doing mathematics, of teaching it, and of teaching how to do it: : : A] revision of mathematical methodology seemed at rst a rather presumptious undertaking. As time went on, however, we were forced to conclude that the formal techniques we were trying out had never been given a fair chance: : :
The use of these rules for formalizing calculational proofs was independently proposed by Anthony Hoare (David Gries, personal communication).
Calculational proofs are indeed a new thing in logic, just as natural deduction was a new thing when it was rst introduced by Gentzen. One reason why this contribution has not been appreciated by logicians is that what Dijkstra and Scholten call formal proofs are not really formal proofs in the usual sense; they are informal proofs written in a relatively strict format. 2 In this note, we de ne the concept of a \calculation," which is a formal counterpart of Dijkstra|Scholten calculational proofs. Calculations are dened in terms of a new formalization DS of predicate logic whose inference rules are replacement rules (1), the usual generalization rule 
The system DS is sound and complete, and any proof tree in DS can be represented as a sequence of calculations. These facts show that any logically valid predicate formula has a \calculational style proof."
2 The Deductive System
In the language of DS, terms and atomic formulas are de ned as in predicate logic (without equality). Formulas are built from atomic formulas and the 0-place connective ? (\false") using the binary connectives and _ and the quanti er 8.
There are 9 axiom schemas in DS: equivalence is commutative
and associative
2 Dijkstra and Scholten 1990] warn the readers that their book \is not a treatise on logic: : : T]he logician is perfectly free to be taken aback by our naive refusal to make some of his cherished distinctions" (p. vii). One of the distinctions the authors ignore is the di erence between formulas and inference rules, and it is impossible to de ne a formal system without it. disjunction is commutative 
and commutes with the universal quanti er
; where x is not free in F .
The inference rules are (1), (2) and (3). It is clear that this deductive system is sound. Its completeness is proved in Appendix.
As an example, note that the re exivity of equivalence
can be proved in DS in one step, using the rst replacement rule:
3 Calculations A calculation is a derivation tree in DS such that every node in it belongs to the leftmost branch or is a leaf. The formulas in the leftmost branch are the members of the calculation; the formulas occurring in the other nodes of the derivation are the hints. Obviously, every hint is an equivalence. Two members of a calculation have special names: the one in the leftmost leaf is the source of the calculation, and the one in the root node is the destination. The hints that are di erent from axioms (4){(11) are the hypotheses of C.
A calculation is bidirectional if the only inference rules used in it are the replacement rules (1).
For instance, (13) is a bidirectional calculation with the source F _ ? F , destination F F , and the empty set of hypotheses.
We will represent calculations as follows: in applications of two-premise rules (1), the horizontal bar will be replaced by ,, and the hint G H will be written to the right of the arrow in braces f g; in applications of one-premise rules (2) and (3), the horizontal bar will be replaced by ). In this notation, bidirectional calculations are distinguished by the absence of the sign ) in them. For instance, (13) will be written as
As another example, here is a calculation with the source F _ 8xG(x), destination F _ G(t), and the empty set of hypotheses; we assume that x is not free in F and that t is free for x in G(x):
It is clear that if there exists a calculation with source F , destination G, and set of hypotheses ?, then G is derivable from ? fF g. If the calculation is bidirectional then we can assert also that F is derivable from ? fGg and that F G, G F are derivable from ?. To prove the rst claim, reverse the order of members in the given calculation; the result will be a calculation again, because every application of any of the two replacement rules will turn into an application of the other replacement rule. To prove the second claim, replace every member H of the calculation with F H; the result will be a calculation whose source (12) is provable in DS and whose destination is F G. The argument for G F is similar.
Our next goal is to establish the provability of some (classes of) formulas in DS by exhibiting in every case an appropriate calculation whose hypotheses are already known to be provable. This will illustrate the usefulness of calculations (and this is also needed for our proof of the completeness of DS). (14) is provable in DS, because it is an instance of (12).
The theorem schemas that we want to prove are
::F F; 
:
(28) Calculations establishing the provability of four of these schemas are shown below; the other 10 are given in Appendix.
To improve readability, we will replace hint formulas by references explaining why they are provable in DS, and we will sometimes combine several derivation steps into one.
Proof of (17) The last calculation shows how to derive (25) from two instances of \lemma" (24). The calculation before the last tells us how to prove the lemma. In this sense, the last two calculations \encode" a proof of (25) in DS. Generally, any proof tree T in DS can be represented as a sequence C 1 ; : : : ; C n of calculations so that the destination of C n is the end formula of T , and for every i (1 i n), the source of C i is an axiom, and the hypotheses of C i are among the destinations of C 1 ; : : : ; C i?1 . This is easy to check by induction on the size of T .
In this sense, all proofs in the formalization of predicate logic introduced above can be reduced to calculations.
Implication
We will use F G as shorthand for :F _ G. For instance, F (F _ G) (29) stands for :F _ (F _ G); it is easy to see that this formula is provable in
DS.
Three topics related to implication will be brie y discussed here: modus ponens, the deduction theorem, and \ping-pong arguments."
The modus ponens rule
is derivable 3 in DS (see Appendix). Consequently, the deductive system DS obtained from DS by adding (30) to the set of inference rules has the same theorems as DS.
Some examples of calculational proofs from Dijkstra and Scholten, 1990] can be conveniently explained in terms of the extended system DS . The de nition of a calculation and the other de nitions introduced in the rst paragraph of Section 3 apply to the extended system without any changes; the only di erence is that now hints are not necessarily equivalences|they may also have the form F G. An application of rule (30) in a calculation will be represented by the symbol ) with the hint written to the right of the arrow, for instance:
, f neutrality of ? g
An inference rule R is derivable in a deductive system if the conclusion (of any instance) of R is derivable from its premises in .
Just as in the less general setting of Section 3, if there exists a calculation with the source F , the destination G, and the set of hypotheses ?, then G is derivable from ? fF g (in DS , and consequently in DS). The deduction theorem stated below shows that, under an additional assumption related to the use of the generalization rule, we can claim also that F G is derivable from ?.
For any calculation C, the variables x from the conclusions 8xF of all applications of rule (2) in C are said to be varied in C. According to the deduction theorem, if there exists a calculation C with the source F , the destination G, and the set of hypotheses ? such that the variables varied in C are not free in F , then F G is derivable from ?. The proof is given in Appendix.
For instance, according to the deduction theorem, calculation (31) establishes the provability of (F _ ?) (F _ G).
\Ping-pong arguments" correspond to the uses of the rule
which is derivable in DS also (see Appendix). The methodological advice given in Dijkstra and Scholten, 1990 ] is \to avoid the ping-pong argument if you can, but to learn to recognize the situations in which it is appropriate" (p. 24). The derivability of (32) shows that, in principle, such arguments can be always eliminated.
Comparison with Related Work
The discussion of predicate logic in Dijkstra and Scholten, 1990] aims at developing a methodology that can be used by the working mathematician (or computer scientist) for discovering and presenting proofs. Our goal in this note is to provide a formal analysis of several aspects of this methodology. Many useful proposals found in the book are not re ected in our discussion of calculations. We can mention two notational conventions as examples. One is to drop parentheses in multiple equivalences. For instance, Dijkstra and Scholten would write (27) as Gries and Schneider 1995] de ne a deductive system that can be used to formalize calculational proofs in propositional logic. Instead of our replacement rules (1), their system E includes the rules
(It includes also a rule for substituting formulas for propositional variables and uses individual axioms instead of axiom schemas.) The authors prove the completeness of E and show, by means of examples, how \calculational proofs" can be formalized in E. 4 The analysis of the calculational style proposed in this note extends the contribution of Gries and Schneider, 1995] in three ways. First, we gave a formal de nition of a calculation. Second, we showed how to represent any proof in a certain sound and complete deductive system as a sequence of calculations. Third, our theory is not restricted to the propositional case.
4
A detailed discussion of this system can be found in Bijlsma and Nederpelt, 1998 ]. Its earlier versions are described in Gries, 1981] and Gries and Schneider, 1993] . The rst of the three inference rules above is mentioned in Baaz and Zach, 1994] .
Appendix: Proofs
Proofs of Formulas from Section 3
Proof of (15) 
in view of the fact that the hint G _ F F can be derived from :G _ F using (24). The proof of the deduction theorem below uses the derivability of the rules
where x is not free in F
and
In view of (24), the derivability of (33) will be proved if we establish the derivability of the rule
This is demonstrated by the calculation
The derivability of (34) is demonstrated by the calculation
, f _ commutes with 8 g
The derivability of (35) The formula 8xG 8xF
can be derived from the premise (36) in a similar way. Now the derivability of the conclusion of (36) from its premise follows using the derivability of (32).
Proof of the Deduction Theorem
Proposition. If there exists a calculation C in DS with the source F , the destination G, and the set of hypotheses ? such that the variables varied in C are not free in F , then F G is derivable from ?. Replace every member H of C with F H. The source of C turns into F F , which equals :F _ F and follows from (22) by the commutativity of disjunction. Applications of the replacement rules (1) turn into applications of the same rules. Applications of (2) turn into applications of (34). Applications of (3) turn into applications of (35). The destination turns into F G.
Proof of the Completeness Theorem
Proposition. Every logically valid formula is provable in DS.
We will prove this fact by relating DS to another formalization of predicate logic, which is de ned and proved to be complete, for instance, in
Chapter 2 of Mendelson, 1987] . The formulas of that other system K are built from atomic formulas using negation, implication and the universal quanti er. In the description of K below we represent negation and implication by the characters and !, to distinguish it from the symbols : and introduced in Sections 3 and 4 as abbreviations.
The axiom schemas of K are
8xF (x) ! F (t); where t is free for x in F (x); (40) 8x(F ! G(x)) ! (F ! 8xG(x)); where x is not free in F :
The inference rules of K are
and the generalization rule (2)|with F understood to stand for a formula of the language of K.
To prove the completeness of DS, we will de ne a translation from the language of DS into the language of K and a translation from the language of K into the language of DS, and will prove the following claims about them: Claim 1. If F is a logically valid formula in the language of DS then F is logically valid also. Claim 2. If F is provable in K then F is provable in DS. Claim 3. For any formula F in the language of DS, F F is provable in DS.
Since K is complete, the completeness of DS follows from Claims 1{3.
The translation is de ned as follows: 1. F = F if F is atomic, 2. ? = (P ! P ) for some propositional symbol P , 3. ( (The expressions connected with the equal sign represent the same formula; these transitions do not correspond to derivation steps.) Proof of (49) Finally, assuming that F F is provable in DS, we need to check that 8xF 8xF is provable in DS also. The last formula can be written as 8xF 8x F ; consequently, it follows by one application of (36).
